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REPLY BRIEF 
Third-party plaintiff and appellant/ Jack C. Daniels, 
hereby replies to the Brief of Respondent in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari: 
POINT I. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ESTOPPEL IS AVAILABLE 
TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR FILING MECHANIC'S LIEN IN UTAH HAS NOT YET 
BEEN DECIDED BY THIS COURT. 
Deseret Federal asserts that AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree 
Development & Energy Co., 714 P2d 289 (1986)/ is dispositive of 
this case. Said case is not in point. 
AAA Fencing Co. involved a situation in which the 
plaintiff sought foreclosure of a mechanic's lienf but did not 
commence the action within the one-year period as provided in 
Section 38-1-11. Defendant failed to assert as an affirmative 
defense the Statute of Limitations. The lower court granted 
summary judgment for plaintiff, and the Supreme Court in that case 
held that it was not necessary for defendant to raise Statute of 
Limitations as an affirmative defense because Section 38-1-11 was 
jurisdictional and not subject to waiver by failure of defendant 
to plead the bar of the statute. 
The instant case involves Section 38-1-7, not Section 
38-1-11. Action in this case was commenced with the one-year 
period of time mandated by Section 38-1-11. The present action 
involves the question of whether or not estoppel is available to a 
materialman or laborer in the creation of the lien, and that 
subject was not even addressed in AAA Fencing Co. 
Although the court used the words "waiver and estoppel," 
in AAA Fencing Co. that case only involved waiver, and the case 
did not involve conduct on the part of an owner inducing a 
mechanic!s lienholder not to file his action in time. This court 
may or may not follow AAA Fencing Co. in that situation. The 
issue of whether or not an owner guilty of misrepresentation is 
estopped to assert an untimely mechanic's lien filing has not yet 
been decided by this court and is an issue which should be 
determined by this court after a full and complete briefing. 
In Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Ut 2d 22, 456 P2d 159 
(1969), the Supreme Court held that: "Waiver or estoppel may be 
found in the face of a manditory statute." The statute referred 
to is Section 63-30-15, which required that in a suit against a 
governmental entity "action must be commenced within one year 
after denial or the denial period as specified herein." In Rice 
the court did not find that the Governmental Immunity Act creates 
a right as well as a remedy and that failure to file within one 
year constitutes a failure of the right as well as of the remedy. 
In the Rice case no doubt the repeated assurances by the insurance 
adjuster were an important consideration which persuaded the court 
to uphold the availability of estoppel in the interests of 
justice, even in the face of a mandatory statute. 
In the instant case we believe that, because of the 
affirmative representation by the owner that Daniels would be paid 
if he would not file his lien, and because of the purpose and 
nature of 38-1-7 the court should, as in Rice, uphold the validity 
of the doctrine of estoppel in cases involving creation of a lien. 
We do not believe that the legislature intended to allow the 
misrepresentations of an owner to be rewarded by an interpretation 
which precludes the assertion of estoppel in those circumstances. 
Utah Savings & Loan v. Mecham, 12 Ut 2d 335, 366 P2d 598 
(1961), cited by Deseret Federal is also not in point. In that 
case the lender had priority over the mechanic's lien claimants, 
and the court said that the lender could lose that priority by its 
own conduct of "concealment" or "misrepresentation." It did not 
hold that a lender had to be guilty of such concealment or 
misrepresentation to be estopped where it did not have priority. 
Likewise In Re Williamsen, 43 B.R. 813 (Bankruptcy D Utah 1984), 
is not in point. That case held that where a lien was timely 
filed, but was invalid on its face, as lacking signature, such 
lien did not constitute notice. As to estoppel the court held 
that it might be a valid argument if the debtor himself were 
raising the issue, but not where a third-party creditor (not in 
privity with the debtor) was raising it. 
POINT II. JUDGE DEEfS ORDER RELEASING MECHANIC'S LIEN 
DID NOT EXCUSE DESERET FEDERAL FROM DUTY OF INQUIRY. 
At page 13 Deseret Federal alleges that had it made 
inquiry as to the validity of Daniels1 lien, it would have found 
an order of Judge Dee releasing the lien. Deseret Federal was on 
notice that there is no procedure for releasing a lien upon the 
posting of a bond—certainly not one (as here)with personal 
sureties who might go bankrupt the next day. Judge Dee's order 
was a nullity on its face and was not a final order under Rule 
54(b), URCP, and was thus "subject to revision at any time" and 
was in fact later revoked. 
POINT III. DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL NOT APPLICABLE AGAINST 
DANIELS. 
At page 13 Deseret Federal alleges that Daniels somehow 
induced Deseret Federal to lend the money and should thus be 
estopped himself. It is admitted by Deseret Federal that Daniels' 
lien was recorded before Deseret Federal's trust deed was 
executed, so Daniels obviously did not induce Deseret Federal to 
do anything. 
POINT IV. DANIELS' PAYMENT WAS NOT CONDITIONAL UPON 
SALE OF UNITS. 
At the top of page 15 Deseret Federal asserts that 
Daniels "was to be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of the 
project." This is not so. The construction contract provided 
that Daniels was to be paid within 60 days of completion, without 
regard to the sale of the units. 
POINT V. DANIELS DOES NOT ASSERT THAT THE MAJORITY OF 
THE COURT MUST AGREE ON REASONS. 
At page 17 of Deseret Federal's Brief, it is asserted 
that "under Daniels' first alternative, there could be no judgment 
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of an appellate court unless a majority of the members of the 
court agreed not only on the judgment : r also on the reasons for 
the judgment, . . ^--r'-.. ^ r ••••is. All that Daniels 
asserts is that a majority mus*- state their reasons. Those 
reasons may be different, :.-:1- they must be stated. 
POINT LSSUES :- C1 r PRECLUDED SUMMARY J UDGMENT. 
At page 15 Deseret Federal concedes that the purpose of 
the $80,253 "is not clear from the record." How then could the 
court deter; .'ie as a n.^ .tfir of Taw that- said sum was not lienable 
when factual issues remain as * D its n.-v.jr- . Daniels is entitled 
to have a factual determination a • ' r\l Uu> $H0r .'pi }> 
represented. Respondent goes on at pac If. o state, 
"At best, Daniels1 argument raises a factual questions as 
to the purposes for the $80f253 'profit1. . . If Daniels1 
lien is invalid because he did not timely record a notice 
of his lien, it does not matter what the lien was for." 
r
 . . . I1];: ie 1 i 2i l w as not fi II! eel 
within the 100-day period, but thp issu^ i:-: whether or not the 
period for filing under 38-1-7 is extended by estoppel. 
CONCH J SI ON 
Daniels1 Petition for Certiorari shows special and 
important reasons for granting a review and should be granted. 
Respectf u1 1 y submi 11-pd : 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
Attorneys for Peti t i onei:, 
Jack C. Daniels 
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